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ABSTRACT
IMPACT OF PROBABILITY OF CRISIS ON THE ECONOMY
Ersal, Eylem 
Master of Economics
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Kıvılcım Metin Özcan 
July 2004
The increased frequency of financial crises in the last two decades led to a 
surge of interest in search for common elements of those crises and to the creation of 
early warning systems as instruments to avoid currency crises by predicting the 
timing of the crises. Along with the early warning systems, observation of increased 
frequency of crisis called forth deeper research of costs of crisis. This study 
combines both areas of research in it by employing a new econometric approach in 
assessing costs of crises. The study utilizes an early warning system in order to 
measure the impact of the predicted probability of crisis on the economy. Later on, 
the predicted probabilities of crises obtained are employed in a country-specific 
VAR system so as to come up with measures of consequences of currency crises. 
The study predicts crises for a sample of 15 emerging market economies over the 
period of 1980-2000. The costs of crises analysis for Latin American countries 
reveals that crises experienced during 1980-2000 caused significant amount of 
reduction in growth rates of output of those countries. Furthermore, the results
ill
suggest that the slowdown in economic activity lasts no more than two years and 
then the economy recovers.
Keywords: Predicting Crises, Costs of Crises, Probit, VAR.
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Ö Z E T
KRİZ OLASE^IĞININ EKONOMİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ
Ersal, Eylem
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: D oç. Dr. K ıvılcım  Metin Özcan 
Temmuz, 2004
Son yirmi yılda artan finansal krizler, bu krizlerin ortak elementlerinin 
araştınimasma ve de krizleri engellem ek adına krizlerin zamanlannın tahmin 
edilm esi için erken uyan sistemlerinin geliştirilmesine yol açmıştır. Bu sistemlerin 
yanısıra, artan krizler, kriz maliyeti konusunda daha derin araştırmalara çağn  
olmuştur. Bu çalışma, bu iki araştırma alanını kriz maliyetini ölçm ede kullandığı 
yeni ekonometrik yaklaşımla birleştirmiştir. Çalışmada, tahmin edilen kriz 
olasılığının ekonomi üzerindeki etkisini ölçm ek için bir erken uyarı sisteminden 
faydalanılmıştır. Sonrasında, para krizlerinin sonuçlannı ölçm ek için elde edilen 
olasılık değerleri her ülke için kurulan VA R sistemlerinde kullanılmıştır. Kriz 
olasılıkları, 1980-2000 dönemi ve 15 gelişmekte olan ülke için hesaplanmıştır. 
Yalnızca Latin Amerika ülkeleri için yapılan kriz maliyeti analizi, krizlerin büyüme 
hızlannda önemli miktarlarda düşüşe sebep olduğunu göstermiştir. Buna ek olarak, 
sonuçlar ekonomik aktivitedeki yavaşlamanın iki yıldan fazla sürmediğini ve 
sonrasında ekonominin toparlandığını göstermiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriz Tahmini, Kriz M aliyeti, Probit, VAR.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
Crisis as a prominent problem is one of the dominant macroeconomic 
phenomenon of our age. The recent crises of 2000 and 2001 and previously the Asian 
crises were the latest in a series of currency crises that at various times in the post- 
Bretton Woods period have engulfed emerging market economies and industrial 
countries alike. The increased frequency of crises channeled the academic research 
into a surge of explicating the common elements of those crises and creating early 
warning systems as instruments to avoid currency crises by predicting the timing of 
the crises. Although it is difficult to fit the characteristics of crises into a single mold, 
some common features nonetheless stand out from the analysis of the behavior of 
various macroeconomic and financial variables. Typically, overvalued exchange rate, 
growing current account deficit and domestic credit expansion are observed prior to a 
crisis. Previously, the literature was shallow in its empirical side since the dataset and 
time period employed were narrow so as to come up with robust results in predicting 
the crises of in-sample and out-sample countries. However, recent usage of monthly 
data for more countries and longer periods and improved econometric techniques 
reinvigorated the literature on early warning systems and gave rise to the 
construction of new models with high predictive power.
Along with the early warning systems, observation of increased frequency of 
crises necessitated deeper research for costs of crises. Magnitudes of
contraction/expansion of economies following crises for short and long-term are still 
being questioned. Currency crises can be very costly in terms of fiscal and quasi­
fiscal costs of restructuring the financial sector and more broadly in terms of the 
effects on economic activity of the inability of financial markets to function 
effectively. The output effects of a currency crisis may depend on a large number of 
factors: conditions prevailing in the real, external, financial sectors; fiscal and 
monetary policies implemented during the period; and structural characteristics of 
the economy. Debt overhangs and capital reversals are two of the fondamental causes 
of significant distortions experienced in the period of crisis. The reversal of capital 
inflows can increase the incidence of non-performing loans and cutting the credit 
underlying the longer-mature projects can reduce the productive activity (See Calvo 
(1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (1999)).
So far, it has often been mentioned that a country should set up a prudent 
infrastructure before opening its capital account. Strengthening of banking sector is 
one of the most important issues under that title. The weakness of the banking sector 
during the crisis period can magnify the disrupting effect of devaluation on the 
balance sheets of productive firms by giving rise to a “credit crunch”.
Another issue to be taken into account is surely the effects of crises on trade. In 
the trade-growth literature it is often emphasized that growth in export could serve as 
an engine of output growth. Since crises profoundly alter the trade flow with abrupt 
changes in exchange rate (commonly a devaluation), it may impinge on the ongoing 
course of growth severely. In theory, a real devaluation is expected to increase the 
competitiveness of exports of the country (see, e.g. Click and Rose (1999)). 
However, if the competitors of the country undertake a similar devaluation, the 
expected expansion would not be realized. The so-called “beggar-thy-neighbor”
effect will prevent the economy from expanding its exports and will cause a 
contraction.
It is known that when the country experiences a speculative attack, government 
needs to make a tradeoff between output and inflation. When capital starts to flee 
from the country, government needs to choose between a contraction in real demand 
and depreciation. Generating a recession and reducing absorption would pull down 
output and letting the exchange rate to depreciate would inflict loss on international 
investors and reduce the magnitude of required transfer of resources. Therefore, costs 
of inflation during crisis episodes depend on the actions undertaken by the 
government. A bigger magnitude of change in growth of output during crisis 
increases the likelihood of a rise in inflation.
The goal of this thesis is to utilize an early warning system in order to measure 
the impact of the predicted probability of crisis on the economy. It is not an attempt 
to formulate or test specific theories, but rather to measure the effect of probability of 
crisis on a proxy to the level of the economic activity. The study looks at a sample of 
emerging market economies over the period of 1980-2000.* Chronology of crises for 
each country is presented in the appendix Table 2.1. The attempt of this text is to 
deduce generalized hypotheses on costs of probability of a crisis on financially open 
developing countries by merging early warning systems methodology and cost of 
crises analysis. The motivation of combining early warning systems methodology 
and cost of crises analysis lies in its evaluation of patterns of selected variables in 
tranquil, crisis and recovery periods. Using probability of crises instead of dates of 
crises enables one to capture the effects of vuberability of the economy at each 
observation of the time interval analyzed.
* Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, 
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela.
The paper contributes to literature in various ways. First, it is apparent that 
those two concepts, early warning systems and costs of crises, are examined 
separately in most of the works done. In this study, however, they will be combined 
and elaborated together in assessing the effects of crises on the economy. Although 
the main theme is to consider the effects of crises on the economy, new values of 
probability of crises are developed touching upon many cornerstone studies in this 
area. Until now, costs of crises are examined by using dates of crises as a binary 
variable in regressions or by setting event analysis frameworks. Unlike the previous 
cost of crises literature, this study evaluates the effects of crises for any period using 
the probability values between 1 and 0 that indicate the susceptibility (or 
proneness/hotness) of the economy to crises by constructing and attributing 
probability values for each period. Thus, the paper contributes to methodological 
issues by employing the probability of crisis estimated by a multivariate panel probit 
model in a vector autoregression system built for each economy.
The text will follow a route as the second chapter covering the literature on the 
early warning systems methodology through various applications and empirical 
studies. Chapter 3 explains the variables employed and the data structure. Chapter 4 
then narrates the attainment of predicted probabilities and issues related to estimation 
of probabilities. The next chapter handles cost of crises literature. Chapter 6 goes on 
with construction of VAR systems for the economies of concern, and ends with the 
analysis of the results. Chapter 7 concludes.
CHAPTER 2
Anticipating Currency Crisis
2.1 Introduction
Before 90s, currency crises were thought to have a significant predictable 
component, as was captured in a series of first-generation models which assert that a 
fixed exchange rate policy combined with excessively expansionary pre-crisis 
fundamentals push the economy into crisis, with the private sector trying to profit 
from dismantling the inconsistent policies (Salant and Henderson (1978); Krugman 
(1979)). In these models unsustmable money-financed fiscal deficits lead to a
:K -." ·
persistent loss of international reserves leaving the exchange rate regime exposed to 
speculative attacks. The experiences of 1970s and 1980s support the predictions of 
first-generation models (Flood and Marion (1999)). However, the currency crises 
experienced in Europe (EMS collapses) in spite of the sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals challenged this view. New models focus on government officials’ 
concern on unemployment. Expectations about the breakdown of the fixed exchange 
rate regime that led to higher domestic interest rates forced the governments to 
abandon the regime. Governments can keep the regime and thus continue the 
disinflation targets at the cost of loss of competitiveness and recession. However, 
devaluation may restore competitiveness and help in the elimination of 
unemployment. Particularly in economies with fi*agile banking systems, highly 
indebted firms and volatile financial markets, maintenance of fixed exchange rate 
became very costly. Thus, second generation models are designed to capture the
features o f speculative attacks that are formed in spite of sound economic 
fundamentals.
More recently, the literature on capital inflows and capital inflow problems 
has suggested another potential source of instability (see, e.g. Montiel and Reinhart 
(1997) for a comprehensive review of the literature). Sudden reversals o f capital 
flows may cause liquidity crises as happened in debt crises of 1982, the Mexican 
crisis in 1994 and the Asian crises in 1997-98. Thus, the liberalization o f capital 
account transactions by allowing this type of short-term capital flows may contribute 
to the instability of the flow of reserves and inability of the country to peg the 
domestic currency.
Recent work on currency crises has focused in a broader set of indicators 
(see, e.g. Kaminsky (1999); Aziz et a l (2000); and many other studies that will be 
introduced in the subsequent section.). Especially after the currency crises of 1990s, 
which resulted in devastating economic, social and political effects, economists have 
had a renewed interest in understanding underlying elements. Especially, the 
contagion aspect of IBnancial crises alarmed international organizations and private 
sector institutions and led them to spend intensive effort to develop models detecting 
the possibility of crises, namely. Early Warning Systems, which wiU be discussed in 
the proceeding part. Those models focus primarily on currency crises. Even though 
the ultimate causes of currency crises cannot be the same for each individual country 
and hence can be revealed best by country-specific analyses, it might be possible to 
identify a common pattern in the development o f crises and delineate common 
symptoms and leading indicators of numerous crises experienced. In addition to 
inferring common indicators of crises, the aforementioned authors also try to
construct methods that could assist in predictiug the exact timing of currency crises
or a specific time horizon that a country becomes highly vulnerable and exposed to 
attacks.
Up to now, there has been several models built such as Kaminsky, Lizando 
and Reinhart’s (1998) (KLR) leading indicators approach (IMF), Frankel and Rose’s 
(1996) (FR) probit regression model, Sachs, Tomell and Velasco’s (1996a) (STV) 
weak fundamentals approach, the Developing Country Studies Division (DCSD) 
model of Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferretti and Pattillo (1999) (IMF), Policy 
Development and Review (PDR) model of Mulder, Perrelli and Rocha (2001) (IMF) 
and the model of Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) (European Central Bank). In 
addition to those there are other private sector models as Goldman Sachs’ GS- 
WATCH, Credit Suisse First Boston’s Emerging Markets Risk Indicator and 
Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock. These models will be briefly reviewed together with 
critics addressed later on. Some specification issues of several selected models are 
presented in Table 2.2 in appendix.
2.2 Early Warning Systems
2.2.1 The leading indicators approach: Kaminsky-Lizando-Reinhart 
(KLR) Model
The leading indicators approach of KLR is based on monitoring the evolution 
of a large number of macroeconomic and financial variables exhibiting a deviant 
behavior in periods preceding a crisis. When an indicator variable exceeds a formerly 
designed indicator-specific threshold value, a warning signal about an upcoming 
crisis in the following months is issued. After consolidating the large group of 
indicators that are gathered from previous works, over 60 variables of ten categories
are picked. A currency crisis is defined to occur when a weighted average of 
monthly percentage depreciations in the exchange rate and monthly percentage 
declines in reserves exceeds its mean by more than three standard deviations. The 
approach is applied on a dataset of 20 countries, including 15 emerging and 5 
industrialized countries, over the sample period of 1970-1995. Indicators that have 
proven to be particularly useful in anticipating crises include the behavior of 
international reserves, the real exchange rate, domestic credit, credit to the public 
sector and domestic inflation.
Later in 2000, Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart update the KLR model by 
adding new variables and find that on a monthly basis real exchange rate 
appreciation, banking crisis, equity prices, exports, ratio of broad money to reserves 
and a recession have high predictive power whereas on an annual basis current 
account deficit relative to both GDP and investment performs revealing.
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) criticize that threshold approach is not 
reasonable in the sense that it causes loss of information since above the threshold 
any level would provide the same information although it is not. Moreover, they state 
that it is difficult to rank situations in terms of vulnerability, because at each time 
different variables would be in the critical zone. Berg and Pattillo (1999) state that 
KLR approach produces predictions, which are better than guesses, and has a 
successfiil out-of-sample performance. However, they also point out that overall 
explanatory power is fairly low and weighted-sum based probabilities have lower 
predictive power compared to ones gathered by probit estimation.
 ^Categories are: 1) capital account; 2) debt profile 3) current account 4) international variables; 5) 
financial liberalization); 6) other financial variables; 7) real sector; 8) fiscal variables; 9) 
institutional/structural factors; 10) political variables.
2.2.2 Probit Regression Model: Frankel-Rose (FR) Model
In Frankel-Rose model, a panel of annual data for over 100 countries is 
examined in the sample period of 1971-1992. They define a currency crash as a 
nominal exchange rate depreciation of at least 25 percent that also exceeds the 
previous year’s change in the exchange rate by at least 10 percent. This definition 
omits unsuccessful speculative attacks. They use a multivariate model where all 
variables are employed simultaneously and estimate probit models pooling all the 
available data across both countries and time.^ FR tests the hypothesis that certain 
characteristics of capital inflows are positively associated with the occurrence of 
currency crashes. The results show that the probabihty of a crisis increases when 
output growth is low, domestic credit growth is high, reserves as a share of M2 are 
low, the real exchange rate is overvalued, the fiscal and current account deficits are 
high, external concessional debt and FDI is small, the economy is more closed and 
foreign interest rates are high. Additionally, neither current account nor government 
budget deficits appear to play an important role in a typical crash.
Berg and Pattillo (1999) remark that although the use of annual data may 
restrict applicability of the approach as an early warning system, it allows the 
analysis of variables such as the composition of external debt for which higher 
frequency data is rarely available. Furthermore, they state that the model fails to 
provide useful guidance on probability of crises in out-of-sample predictions.
 ^Variables are: 1) commercial bank debt; 2) concessional debt; 3) variable-rate debt; 4) short-term 
debt; 5) FDI; 6) public sector debt; 7) multilateral debt; 8) the ratio of international reserves to 
monthly percentage of imports; 9) the current account as a percentage of GDP; 10) external debt as a 
percentage of GNP; 11) real exchange rate divergence; 12) government budget as a percentage of 
GDP; 13) percentage growth rate of domestic credit; 14) percentage growth rate of real output per 
capita; 15) foreign interest rate; 16) northern growth rate.
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2.2.3 Weak Fundamentals Approach: Sachs-Tornell-Velasco (STV)
Model
In this study, financial events following the devaluation of the Mexican peso 
are examined to uncover lessons about the nature of financial crises. In STV model, 
occurrence of crises is analyzed according to three variables, real exchange rate 
overvaluation, increase in commercial bank lending and level of international 
reserves. Countries with overvalued exchange rates and weak banking systems (weak 
fundamentals) are likely to suffer from severe crisis only if they have low reserves 
relative to monetary liabilities. A country with low reserves could not accommodate 
capital outflows, and weak fundamentals avoid the country from fighting the attack 
with high interest rates. Consequently, the economy succumbs and the attack is 
successful. For the sample of 23 countries, the crisis index is regressed on linear and 
nonlinear interactive combinations of three variables for the turmoil period of mid- 
90s.'^  In their reproduction of STV model Berg and Pattillo mention that none of the 
forecasts of this model performs well. Later on, Tomell (1998) updates this model by 
stacking observations from 1995 and 1997 crises and finds that this new model fits 
fairly well and produces good predictions.
2.2.4 Multinomial Probit Technique: Developing Country Studies 
Division (DCSD) Model of Berg, Borensztein, Milesi-Ferretti and
Pattillo
The DCSD model of Berg and Pattillo also employs a panel-probit model. In 
the paper, besides reproducing the KLR results, the authors modify the dataset and
 ^The crisis index is a weighted average of percent change in reserves and the devaluation rate 
with respect to U.S. dollar.
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examine it within a multivariate probit framework.^ The model is obtained using the 
same crisis definition and 4i5 KLR variables plus three additional variables, then 
simplifying by dropping insignificant variables. The additional variables are the level 
of M2/reserves, the current account to GDP ratio and the ratio of short-term debt to 
reserves. The results indicate that the most significant variables are real exchange 
rate relative to trend, current account deficit, reserves growth, export growth and the 
ratio of short-term debt to reserves.
2.2.5 Policy Development and Review (PDR) model of Mulder,
Perrelli and Rocha
The third model produced by IMF staff is PDR model, which incorporates 
balance sheet variables into the DCSD model. They find that leveraged financing and 
a high ratio of short-term debt to working capital at the corporate level, balance sheet 
indicators of bank and corporate debt to foreign banks as a share of exports, and a 
legal regime variable as a proxy to shareholders’ rights have significant explanatory
power.
2.2.6 Multinomial Logit Technique: European Central Bank Model
of Bussiere and Fratzscher
This new model uses multinomial logit technique to predict crisis probability 
within a specific time horizon. They use a monthly data set for 32 emerging market 
economies for the years 1993 to 2001 considering the period of integrated capital 
markets. They criticize existing models by developing a new concept as post-crisis *
* They omit the five European countries of KLR country sample and add other emerging 
market economies. Also diey estimate only through April 1995.
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bias. They put forward that separating time into three states as pre-crisis periods, 
post-crisis periods and tranquil periods help out to get rid of this bias. The logic 
behind this new division is the significantly different patterns of variables in tranquil 
and recovery (post-crisis) periods. They also employ contagion indicators. They find 
that using multinomial logit reduces number of false signals and missed crisis.
2.2.7 Private Sector Models
Following the Asian crises, most major banks and financial institutions 
developed their in-house early warning systems. Those models attempted to assess 
values and risks in emerging market economies and to set foreign currency trading 
strategies. Although most of those models are abandoned, the increased volatility in 
emerging markets in 2000 and 2001 brought out new private models.
i) Goldman Sachs’s GS-WATCH
They use a logit regression to illustrate the likelihood of a crisis occurring 
within three months. The predictor variables include credit booms, real exchange rate 
misalignment, export growth, reserve growth, external financing requirements, 
changes in stock prices, political risk, contagion, and global liquidity.
ii) Credit Suisse First Boston’s emerging Markets Risk Indicator (CSFB)
They also use a logit model employing real exchange rate deviations from
trend, the ratio of debt to exports, growth in credit to the private sector, output 
changes, reserves to imports, changes in stock prices, oil prices, and a regional 
contagion dummy.
iii) Deutsche Bank Alarm Clock (DBAC)
They define separate exchange rate and interest rate “events” as depreciations 
and jointly estimate the probability of these two events allowing bi-directional
12
influence within each other. Exchange rate event is regressed on changes in stock 
prices, domestic credit, industrial production, real exchange rate deviations and a 
contagion variable. They also calculate an “action trigger” to identify cut-off 
probability levels at which investors should change their positions by maximizing the 
profits of the investor at the time.
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CHAPTER 3
Data and Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Variables
The information provided in recent research discussed in previous section and 
numerous varied experiences with currency crisis reveal that some variables are quite 
significant in their contribution to the prediction of crises. Main indicators that will 
be employed in prediction of probability of crises, classified by category, are as
follows:
External sector variables
Capital account problems of a country may be an important component of the 
underlying reasons of crisis. Those problems may become more severe when the 
country’s foreign debt is large and capital flight increases.
Amount of international reserves held, as mentioned in STV model, is crucial 
before or during a crisis. A stock of strong reserves helps the policymakers to fight 
with speculative attacks. Also consistently decreasing reserves is an accurate signal 
of market pressure and a possible subsequent crisis. The data for international 
reserves is taken from International Financial Statistics of IMF and is calculated as 
12-month percent change in reserves.
The differential between foreign and domestic real interest rate may 
anticipate currency crises as high world interest rates, which is US real interest rates 
in this study, may lead to capital outflows. One should also note that world interest
14
rate acts as a channel that transmits external shocks to the economy. Both are 
employed in the analysis the differential and world interest rates.
Current account is the other foot of external sector, and deterioration in 
current account is a part of a currency crisis. Growth rates of exports and imports, 
trade balance, terms of trade and current account to GDP ratio are measures of 
current account employed in the analysis. Large negative shocks to exports, terms of 
trade and positive shocks to imports are interpreted as symptoms of financial crises. 
Required data is taken from DFS CD-ROM.
Real exchange rate is important in its interaction with volumes of export, 
import, since it is a good measure of trade competitiveness of the economy. 
Moreover, it also affects capital account movements. Because the financial investors 
try to avoid short-term capital losses, they flee from countries in which they expect 
that large nominal exchange rate depreciation wiU soon take place. A real exchange 
rate appreciation during the capital inflow period, relative to past average values, 
indicates a greater risk of currency depreciation. Also, lack of confidence in the 
program or policymakers increases the pressure on the exchange rate, which after the 
crisis makes a huge upward jump. Furthermore, real exchange rate overvaluations 
and a weak external sector contribute to the vulnerability of the economy. The real 
exchange rate is derived from a nominal exchange rate index, which is adjusted for 
relative consumer prices. The measure is defined as the relative price of foreign 
goods (in domestic currency) to the price of domestic goods. The nominal exchange 
rate index is a weighted average of the 19 OECD countries. The deviations are 
calculated by regressing the exchange rate index on a time trend. The specification of 
the trend (log, linear or exponential) is selected on a country-by-country basis to 
capture the best fit.
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Financial sector variables
Currency crises have been linked to rapid growth in credit experienced in the 
pre-crisis period. Loose monetary policy can fiiel a currency crisis (see Krugman 
1979). Domestic credit and money multiplier are employed in the analysis to assess 
this effect. Domestic credit is obtained both by calculating the growth rate of 
domestic credit and domestic credit-GDP ratio in real terms. Money multiplier is 
calculated as the 12-month percent change in the ratio of broad money to base 
money.
To calculate the difference between money demand and money supply a 
variable called “Excess” real M l balance is defined as in Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999). It is the percentage difference between actual M l in real terms and an 
estimated demand for money; the latter is assumed to be a function o f real GDP, 
domestic inflation and a time trend.
Another important variable is M2 over reserves ratio. M2 includes the 
potential amount of liquid monetary assets that agents can convert into foreign 
exchange. If this ratio is high, a self-fulfilling panic among investors is more likely to 
occur. The data is taken fi"om IPS and the variable is utilized both in level and as 
growth rate.
An increase in lending-deposit interest rate spread in the domestic economy 
can capture a decline in loan quality. High real domestic interest rates could also be a 
sign of liquidity crunch leading to a slowdown and banking fragility. Change in bank 
deposits could also be the sign o f vulnerability in the sense that bank runs precede 
most banking and currency crises (see Dornbusch et al. (1995)).
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Industrial production growth and real GDP growth are employed 
interchangeably to assess the effects of recessions and the decline in real sector of the 
economy on the whole economic situation. Industrial production is taken from IPS of 
IMF and GDP is gathered from World Economic Outlook by interpolation of 
quarterly (and when not available annual) data. Growth rate of unemployed 
population is also included in the empirical analysis. Source of the data is either IFS 
or ILO statistical reports compiled due to each one of the data set being rudimentary.
In addition to recessions, stock prices are also used as a variable for the real 
sector, since burst of asset bubbles precede financial crises (see Calomiris and 
Gorton (1991)), As for growth rate of unemployed population data, source of the data 
is either IFS or International Finance Corporation (IFC) depending on availability of 
data for the specific country.
Fiscal Sector
Government budget surplus/deficit is used as a proxy to fiscal deficits and 
public debt, which may sometimes be the sole (as in debt crises) or part of the 
problems underlying the crises. The data is taken from IFS CD-ROM, When 
available, it is used in monthly basis, and when not, it is interpolated from quarterly 
data.
Banking Crises
Since the mid-1980s, banking crises have come to the forefront of 
international economics. If the banking sector is not sound and or is already 
experiencing a crisis around the time of the currency crisis, the supply of domestic 
credit to domestic firm is likely to get disrupted. With devaluation adversely
Real sector
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affecting the balance sheets of their clients and a rise in non-performing loans, banks 
may roll back their lending activities or go bankrupt.
Although the concrete direction of causality between banking and currency 
crises could not be verified unambiguously, it is possible to state inferentially that 
they are related. For instance, in the ‘Twin Crises” Kaminsky et al. suggest that 
banking crises do not lead to currency crises, however if the banking system is 
vulnerable at the time of crises it collapses during crises and deepens the impacts of
crises.
For all these variables (with the exception of deviation of the real exchange 
rate from trend, the “excess” of real M l balances), the variable on a given month is 
defined as the percentage change in the level of the variable with respect to its level a 
year earlier. Filtering the data by using the 12-month percentage change ensures that 
the units are comparable across countries and that the transformed variables are 
stationary with well-defined moments, and free from seasonal effects. Additionally, a 
table of variables with expected signs and explanations of their effects is included in 
appendix (see Table 3.1),
The data set used is largely taken from International Financial Statistics 
database of IMF. Despite the breadth of the database, it should be noted that the data 
availability of a variable could differ substantially across countries and within the 
time interval for a specific country.
In this study instead of creating market pressure indexes using changes in 
international reserves, interest rates and exchange rates, dates of crises are used for 
the creation of the probability of crises that are taken from the Kaminsky & Reinhart, 
1999 and updates. The reason is that, the analysis in this thesis does not claim a 
success in predicting the exact timing of crises. Free from the time of the crisis, the
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main endeavor here is to present a new approach in assessing the cost of crises, 
which utilizes the newly developed early warning system procedures.
3.2 Methodology
Data sets that combine time series and cross sections are common in tracking 
the explanatory power of various indicators employed to assess timing of crises. 
Modeling in this setting, however, requires complex specifications. The fixed effects 
model is a reasonable approach when it is for sure that the differences between units 
can be viewed as parametric shifts of the regression fimction, that the sample 
employed is the population. When the population appears to be the sample, then 
there will be fixed parameters across cross-sectional units. However, in the setting of 
this study only 15 of all developing countries are analyzed, which means that 
individual specific constant terms are randomly distributed across cross-sectional 
units. This specification is denoted as,
T iP a+ A it + eit
where eu = Uj +mit and Ui characterizes each cross-sectional unit and constant over 
time.
Since in probit model the conditional probability approaches one or zero with 
higher rate, it might yield better estimation results than the logit model when 
studying financial crises. The probit analysis model, called Goldberger (1964), 
assumes that there is an underlying response variable y  ¡t, which is unobservable, 
defined by the regression relationship,
y\^PXif\-Ui
y*it is defined such that
y=l if there is a crisis in the period
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>»=0 otherwise
Then the probability of crisis is derived from the cumulative distribution 
fimction ^ij3xit) after estimating
ProbOiFll Xit )=G{^Xit)
In this study a multivariate model is estimated where all the variables are 
employed simultaneously. Monthly data for 15 countries over the period 1980-2000 
is employed. To avoid simultaneity bias that may occur, the dependent variable 
“crisis” is regressed on one month lagged variables.
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CHAPTER 4
Estimation and Results
Finding the predicted probability values for crises, different empirical 
specifications are estimated in order to obtain the best fit. As explained above, there 
are two alternatives in measuring the effect of the variables domestic credit 
expansion, growth rate of output, M2-reserves ratio and M2 multiplier. The best of 
each pair is selected based on the amount of explanatory power created by different 
combinations, after controlling for econometric issues.
To obtain the most information from the wide set of variables mentioned 
above and to cope with multicollinearity problems, instead of dropping variables 
principal components are constructed for each category defined in the previous 
section. We skipped fiscal sector since the data available for this category is very 
limited.
Table 4.1 Random Effects Panel Probit Model
Random-effects probit 
Group variable ( i ) : id
Number of obs = 2597
Number of groups = 15
Random effects u i~  Gaussian Obs per group: min = 
avg= 173.1 
m ax= 243
82
W aldchi2(3) = 48.73
Log likelihood =-164.06622 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
crisis coefficient Std. Err. P>lzl
real sector** 0.167305 0.073231 2.28 0.022
external sector*  -0.36511 0.063877 -5.72 0
financial sector* -0.25173 0.06374 -3,95 0
Panel probit estimation of crisis model for twelve countries over 1980-2000. Monthly data.
* denotes that the variable is significant at the 99% confidence level. ** denotes that the variable is significant at
the 95% confidence level.
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The large value of the Wald test statistic points at the total significance of the 
variables in explaining the dependent variable. Since the coefficients gathered by 
probit are hard to interpret and computing marginal effects for vectors obtained by 
principal components is meaningless, they will not be analyzed. Moreover, 
evaluating signaling power of the variables employed is beyond the scope of this 
study. The predicted probability values of crises for Latin American countries are in 
the appendix (Figure 1).^
® We depicted the probabilities only for Latin American countries since they will be investigated in the 
cost of crisis framework as a case study.
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CHAPTER 5 
Costs of Crises
5.1 Introduction
Currency crises are not neutral and have effects on various sectors of an 
economy both in short and long-run. In this section, the predicted probabilities of 
crises obtained in the previous section will be employed so as to come up with 
measures of consequences of currency crises. Different than the previous work, 
instead of using trends of several variables or crisis dates to acquire necessary 
information for drawing inferential statements about costs of crises, this study 
employs predicted probabilities and reveals the pattern followed by the examined 
variable before during and after the crises in a structural VAR system for each 
economy. Thus, this approach is valuable not only in assessing the outcomes of 
crises, but also in assessing the explanatory power of various variables in signaling 
currency crises. As opposed to many studies held, this study is not limited to any 
single crisis episode due to the broad time horizon included in the research. Although 
it is possible to implement this methodology for a wide set of countries, only the 
Latin American case will be elaborated in this study for tractability reasons.
5.2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature on Costs of Crises
Financial crises can be very costly, both in terms of fiscal and quasi-fiscal 
costs of restructuring the financial sector and more broadly in terms of the effect on 
economic activity due to the inability of financial markets to function effectively.
23
The effects of a currency crisis on the economy may depend on a large 
number of factors: conditions prevailing in the real, external, and financial sectors; 
fiscal and monetary policies implemented during the period; and the structural 
characteristics of the economy. Debt overhangs during crisis can conduce to hinder 
aggregate investment and economic activity and since most of the developing 
countries’ external debt is denominated in foreign currencies, they are particularly 
vulnerable to this effect, which may be one of the reasons of observing the negative 
effect of an increase in probability of crisis on output in the sample (see Calvo (1998) 
and Mishkin (1999)). Capital reversal is one of the fundamental causes of significant 
distortions experienced in the period of crisis. The reversal of capital inflows can 
increase the incidence of non-performing loans and cutting the credit underlying the 
longer-mature projects can reduce the productive activity (see Calvo (1998) and 
Calvo and Reinhart (1999)). Moreover, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) has highlighted 
that the capital flow reversal that creates difficulties in rolling over short-term debt 
can also shrink the level of economic activity by squeezing the liquidity available 
within the economy.
So far, it has often been mentioned that a country should construct an 
infrastructure of prudence before opening its capital account. Strengthening of 
banking sector is one of the most important issues under this title. The weakness of 
the banking sector during the crisis period can magnify the disrupting effect of 
devaluation on the balance sheets of productive firms by giving rise to a “credit 
crunch”. Mishkin (1999) claims that such a contraction in credit brought about by 
banking sector problems aggravates the crisis in emerging markets and the reduction 
in economic activity. It is also argued that the liberalization of the external capital 
account without taking regulatory and strengthening actions becomes a source of
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external vulnerability and thus a severe cause of a reduction in the growth of the 
economy (see Furman and Stiglitz (1999) and the World Bank’s Global Economic 
Prospects (1997/98)).
Another issue to be taken into account is surely the effects of crises on trade. 
In the trade-growth literature it is often emphasized that growth in export could serve 
as an engine of output growth. Since crises profoundly alter the trade flow with 
abrupt changes in exchange rate (commonly a devaluation), it may impinge on the 
ongoing course of growth severely. In theory, a real devaluation is expected to 
increase the competitiveness of exports of the country (see, e.g. Glick and Rose 
(1999)). However, if the competitors of the country undertake a similar devaluation, 
the expected expansion would not be realized. The so-called “beggar-thy-neighbor” 
effect will prevent the economy from expanding its exports and wfll cause a 
contraction.
It is known that when the country experiences a speculative attack, 
government needs to make a tradeoff between output and inflation. When capital 
starts to flee from the country, government needs to choose between a contraction in 
real demand and depreciation. Generating a recession and reducing absorption would 
pull down output and letting the exchange rate depreciate would inflict loss on 
international investors and reduce the magnitude of required transfer of resources. 
Therefore, costs of inflation during crisis episodes depend on the actions undertaken 
by the government. Another study claims that prices respond positively to any 
deviation o f real output from trend (Christiana Römer (1996)). Therefore a bigger 
magnitude of change in growth of output during crisis increases the likelihood of a 
rise in inflation.
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As the theoretical literature differs in its explanations of costs of crises, there 
are two opposing views on the effects o f a currency crisis in empirical literature. The 
traditional view is that, with price and wage rigidities, a sharp nominal devaluation 
would produce a real depreciation in the short-run, increase exports and stimulate 
employment and output. By contrast, an alternative view is that sharp devaluation 
could have contractionary effect, working through such channels as a wealth effect 
on aggregate demand, higher production costs, disruption in credit markets, or a 
sudden cessation in capital inflows limiting imported capital goods (as in Moreno 
(1999)). In addition to the discussion about the sign of the effect, views about the 
persistency of the effects of currency crises, in other words factors that cause the 
difference in sign or persistency of the effects of currency crises also vary. 
Furthermore, the empirical literature differs in the samples used (such as studies that 
focus on single crisis episodes such as Mexican crisis or Asian crisis-e.g. Calvo and 
Mendoza (1996); Lane and Phillips (1999); Calvo and Reinhart (1999)- and studies 
that analyze output developments in a broader sample of countries- e.g. Mhesi- 
Ferretti and Razin (1998 and 1999), Aziz et al. (2000), Bordo et al. (2001), Barro 
(2001), Gupta et al. (2000), Hutchison (2001) and Hutchison and Neuberger (2001a, 
b)). In the proceeding part several different studies and views will be overviewed and 
assessed.
Cerra and Saxena (2003) examine whether a recession following a crisis 
permanently lowers the level of output. They investigate the extent to which output 
has recovered in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. A regime-switching approach that 
introduces two state variables is used to decompose recessions in a set of six Asian 
countries into permanent and transitory components. It is found out that while growth
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recovered fairly quickly after the crisis, there is evidence of permanent losses in the 
levels of output in aU of the countries studied.
However, Barro (2001) does not detect a persistent adverse influence of 
currency and banking crises on long-run economic growth. A panel analysis for a 
group of five East Asian economies shows that in 1997-98, crisis reduced economic 
growth over a five-year period by 3% per year. Analysis for a broader set of 
countries revealed that over the same horizon, crises reduce economic growth by 2% 
and no evidence is found supporting the persistent adverse effects of crises on 
economic growth. Park and Lee (2002) find that a V-shaped pattern o f growth is 
associated with crises.
Alternatively, using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 24 
emerging-market economies in their study, Hutchison and Neuberger (2001) find out 
that currency and balance of payments crises reduce output by about 5-8 percent over 
a two-three year period. This adverse effect is two to four rimes larger than the 
average output loss in a developing economy. Typically, growth tends to return to 
trend by the third year following the crisis. The large output costs are likely related to 
their dependence on private capital markets and abrupt reversals in capital inflows 
that in turn force substantial real-side adjustment.
Greene (2002) examines whether capital outflows may have contributed to 
output declines during the Asian crises by reducing the financing available for 
domestic investment. Panel data regressions buüt suggest a positive, short-term 
relationship between net capital inflows and investment during the period before 
1997 in five Asian countries once real net capital flows are netted out from real flows 
of private bank credit. In addition, net real private inflows and real private
’’ Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
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investment appear to have been cointegrated in at least three of these countries, 
suggesting a long-term relationship as well.
Aziz et al. (2000), comparing GDP growth after a crisis with trend GDP 
growth, assert that, for approximately 40 percent of crises output growth returned to 
trend in a little more than 1.5 years time. It is also estimated that the average 
recovery time is shorter in emerging market countries than in industrial countries, 
although the cumulative output loss on average is larger. The authors suggest that 
this difference in recovery time and cumulative output losses may be due to the 
higher mean and variance of output growth in emerging market economies compared 
to industrial economies.
Gupta et al. (2001) discuss whether currency crises are necessarily 
contractionary. They find that more than 40 percent of the 195 crisis episodes across 
91 countries have been expansionary and reject the notion that output severity of 
crises has risen over time. However, they do not find that large and more developed 
countries are often more subject to contraction during crises than small economies. In 
addition, this paper identifies factors that contribute to such diverse growth effects. 
The authors find that crises that are preceded by large capital inflows occur at the 
peak of an economic boom, under a relatively free capital mobility regime, and in 
countries that trade less with the rest of the world, are more likely to be 
contractionary in the short-run. The growth effects get further exacerbated in the 
short-run if trade competitors devalue, crude oil price rise, and post-crisis period is 
marked by tight monetary policy. However, large private capital flows, which could 
be detrimental to growth in a crisis environment, are found to be beneficial to growth 
in the long-run, posing an important “short-versus-long-run” policy trade-off for 
developing countries.
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Ranciere et al. (2003) discusses that growth and welfare can be higher in 
crisis prone economies. They show that there is a robust empirical link between per- 
capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with 
active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises 
have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions.
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CHAPTER 6
Data and Empirical Analysis
6.1 Methodology
After obtaining the predicted probability values, the next step is to assess the 
effects of those values on the economy. In order to evaluate those effects, we 
constructed an unrestricted VAR equations system in which the effect of probability 
of crisis on growth rate of output is sought. The systems incorporate probability of 
crisis, inflation real exchange rate and growth rate of GDP as variables. For each 
country, the optimal lag length is selected according to Akaike, Schwarz and 
Hannan-Quinn information criteria, final prediction error and sequential modified 
likelihood ratio test. For tractability reasons, the VAR fi'amework is constructed for 
the Latin American countries only.® In the following section, the results driven from 
the estimation of the model are analyzed.
6.2 Estimation and Results
The output of the estimation of the model gave the impulse responses that 
enable us to interpret the sign and significance of relations within exogenous 
variables and endogenous variables. It is important to mention that the band in the 
graphs shows a significant response of the variable of concern whenever the line zero 
is not included in the band. The horizontal axis demonstrates the number of months
' Argentine, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela
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at which the effect of the shock is examined. The graphs are in the appendix (Figure
2).
As seen in the graphs, an increase in the probability of crisis, for most of the
economies, causes a reduction in the growth rate of output. In Argentina, growth rate
of output significantly fails down and keeps decreasing until the 11* month. For 
Bolivia, the impact of probability of crisis seems insignificant, although the two- 
standard deviations band is falling below zero. The pattern of growth o f output is 
different for Brazil because the detrimental effect of crisis is significantly seen after a 
year the shock is given. The contractionary period for Brazil lasts for almost a year. 
The Chilean economy is also adversely affected by the probability of crisis, however 
output recovers faster than the Argentina case, approximately in six months. 
Furthermore, the country experiences an almost significant jump in the growth rate 
of output after the contraction, which soothes after the 32nd month. Colombia is one 
of the cases in which output slowdown is clearly seen and it lasts more than two 
years (26 months). The impulse response of Mexican economy is quite similar to that 
of Colombia except that the contraction lasts for 24 months. In Peru, the economy is 
significantly affected by the probability of crisis and the effect of shock persists for 2 
years as in Mexico. Venezuela, like Brazil, experiences a late reduction in its growth 
rate of output, which lasts approximately four months.
The magnitudes of reductions are changing and they are more restricted for 
Bolivia. Analyzing the probability values graphed in the appendix for the previous 
chapter reveals that the predicted probabilities for Bolivia has big gaps and the 
behavior o f output in this case can be attributed to the significant amount of missing 
data. Except Bolivia, the probability of crisis negatively affects the growth rate of
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output. Especially, in Argentina, Mexico, Colombia and Peru, currency crisis 
significantly wards off output growth.
In developing countries, any crack in the confidence of investors reverses the 
direction of flow of capital. Due to capital outflows, developing countries undergo a 
shortfall of credit during crisis episodes, which is the main reason of slowdown 
observed in every sector. In this perspective, it is reasonable that output growth rates 
of most of the countries examined undergo a fall behind trend.
The evidence drawn from the estimation output realizes the theoretical 
explanations summarizing the contractionary effects of crises as in Moreno (1999). 
The increase in exports due to devaluation is suppressed by the decline in aggregate 
demand, which in turn reduces the economic activity in the country. In each country, 
a positive change in the probability o f crisis adversely affects growth rate of output 
in the wake and aftermath of crisis. Although, it would be a fallacy to classify them 
as sole underlying reasons of contraction during crisis episodes, it is clear that none 
of the country experiences in our sample reveals an expansionary effect in contrast to 
the theory of Gupta, Mishra and Sahay (2003).
One other discussion in the literature of output cost of crises is about the 
persistency of the effect of crises. Although, we did not measure the effect of crisis 
on output level, based on our findings we can state that all o f the countries in our 
sample that experiences a significant fall in their rates of growth of output enter into 
a recovery period after approximately 20 months (Argentina, Mexico and Colombia). 
This result is similar to findings of Aziz et al. (2000).
Inevitably, the severity of crises and many other prevailing conditions of the 
time covered here affect the results, but it is obvious that in the Latin American case.
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as a part of developing country context, currency crises are expected to reduce 
growth rate of output for a period of approximately and at most two years.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
The increased frequency o f crises in the last two decades aroused interest in 
investigating various aspects o f crises. The costly experience o f currency crises 
invigorated empirical studies that are developed to find variables with high signaling 
power. Under the leadership o f international institutions like IMF, private 
international financial institutions and central banks of many countries early warning 
system models are created as instruments to avoid currency crises by predicting the 
timing of the crises. In addition to these recent improvements in this research area, 
investigating the costs of a crisis has also gained importance. Since financial crises 
can be very costly, both in terms o f fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of restructuring the 
financial sector and more broadly in terms of the effect on the economic activity due 
to the inability of financial markets to function effectively, different methodologies 
developed and results are still ambiguous.
In line with these practices, we constructed a model that predicts probability 
of crises molding three variables as real sector, external sector and financial sector 
combining the explanatory power o f various variables using principal components. 
The main ambition in this study is to utilize the early warning system procedure to 
come up with consequences regarding the cost o f crises.
The predicted probabilities attained from a multivariate panel probit 
framework are employed in an unrestricted VAR system constructed for each 
economy. We restricted the sample to Latin American countries in the analysis of
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impulse response of growth rate of output to a positive change in the probability of 
crises. The results indicate that six of the nine countries examined experiences a 
slowdown in their rates of growth of output. Although the time required for recovery 
changes for each country, in the countries that we observed the most severe 
reduction, economic activity takes off after the 20* month on average. Therefore, we 
can state that, change in growth rate of output caused by detrimental effects of 
currency crises is not permanent. Although the methodology we used is brand-new in 
the literature and should be improved and extended, our results make a consistent 
inference for the contractionary effects of currency crises for developing countries.
35
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adelman, I. and E. Yeldan. 2000. “The Minimal Conditions for a Financial Crisis: A 
Multiregional Intertemporal CGE Model of the Asian Crisis”, World 
Development 2^ (6), 1087-1100.
Altomonte, C. and C. Guagliano. 2001. “Competing Locations? Market Potential and 
FDI in Central and Eastern Europe vs the Mediterrenean”, Licos Discussion 
Paper
Azyl, J., F. Caramazza, and R. Salgado. 2000. “Currency Crises: In Search of 
Common Elements”, IMF Working Paper 00/67.
Barro, R. 2001. “Economic Growth in East Asia Before and After the Financial 
Crisis”, NBER Working Paper, No. 8330.
Beckmann, D. and L. Menkhoff. 2004. “Early Warning Systems: Lessons from New 
Approaches”, In: Michael Frenkel, Alexander Karmann and Bert Scholtens 
(Eds.), Sovereign Risk, Financial Crises and Stability.
Berg, A. 1999. “The Asia Crisis: Causes, Policy Responses, and Outcomes”, IMF 
Working Paper 99/138.
Berg, A. and C. Pattillo. 1999. “Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test”, IMF Staff 
Papers 46 (2).
Berg, A. and C. Pattillo. 1999. “Predicting Currency Crises: The Indicators Approach 
and an Alternative”, Journal o f International Money and Finance 18:561- 
586.
Berg, A. and C. Pattillo. 2000. The Challenge o f Predicting Economic Crises. 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Berg, A., E. Borensztein and C. Pattillo. 2004. “Assessing Early Warning Systems: 
How Have They Worked in Practice?”, IMF Working Paper 04/52.
Bordo, M., B. Eichengreen, D. Klingbiel and M. S. Martinez-Peria, 2001. “Financial 
Crises”, Economic Policy, April.
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum, and J. D. M. Fisher. 2003. “Fiscal Shocks and Their 
Consequences”, NBER Working Paper, No.9777.
36
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo. 2000. “Understanding the Korean and 
Thai Currency Crises”, Economic Perspectives (Q III):45-60.
Bussiere, M. and M. Fratzscher. 2002. ‘Towards a New Early Warning System of 
Financial Crises” European Central Bank Working Paper Series, No. 145.
Calomiiis, C. and Gary Gorton. 1991. “The Origins Banking Panics: Models, Facts 
and Bank Regulation, in Hubbard, G. (eds.) Financial Markets and Financial 
Crises, University o f Chicago Press, Chicago, III.
Calvo, Guillermo A. 1998. “Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple 
Economics o f Sudden Stops”, Journal o f  Applied Economics, v. 1, iss. 1, pp. 
35-54
Calvo, Guillermo, A., 1998, “Capital Flows and Capital M arket Crises: The Simple 
Economics of Sudden Stops,” Journal o f Applied Economics, Vol. 1 
(November), pp. 35-54.
Calvo, G. and Enrique Mendoza. 1996. “ Mexico’s Balance of Payments Crises. A
Chronicle of a Death Foretold”, Journal o f International Economics, 41, 235- 
264.
Calvo, Guillermo, A., and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1999, “When Capital Inflows Come 
to a Sudden Stop: Consequences and Policy Options” (unpublished;
Maryland: University of Maryland).
Caprio, G. and D. KlingbieL 2003. “Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial 
Crises”, World Bank Research Data Set.
Cerra, V. and S. C. Saxena. 2003. “Did Output Recover from the Asian Crisis?”,
IMF Working Paper 03/48.
Dooley, M. P. 2000. “Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises Be 
Avoided?”, NBER Working Paper, No. 7531.
Dombusch, R., I. Goldfajn, and R. 0 . Valdes. 1995. “Currency Crises and 
Collapses”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2).
Edwards, S. 2004. “Financial Openness, Sudden Stops and Current Account 
Reversals”, NBER Working Paper, No. 10277.
Eichengreen, B. and M. D. Bordo. 2002. “Crises Now and Then: What Lessons from 
the Last Era o f Financial Globalization?”, NBER Working Paper, No. 8716.
Feldstein, M. 2002. “Economic and Financial Crises in Emerging Market
Economies: Overview of Prevention and Management”, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 8837.
37
Flood, R. and N. Marion. 1999. “Perspectives on the Recent Currency Crisis 
Literature”,
International Journal o f  Finance and Economics 4:1-26.
Frankel, J. A. and A. K. Rose. 1996. “Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An 
Empirical Treatment”, Journal o f International Economics 41: 351-366.
Furman, Jason and Joseph Stiglitz, 1999, ‘Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights 
from East Asia”, Brookings Papers On Economic Activity (1998:2), ppl-135.
Click, Reuven and Andrew Rose, 1998, “ Contagion and Trade: Why are currency 
Crises Regional”, NBER Working Paper No. 6806.
Goldberger, A. S. (1964), Econometric Theory, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Goldstein Morris, Graciela .L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart, 1999. “Assessing 
Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging M arkets.”, 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Greene, J. E. 2002. “The Output Decline in Asian Crisis Countries: Investment 
Aspects”, IMF Working Paper 02/25.
Greene, W.H. 1993. Econometric Analysis, MacMillan Publishing Company.
Gupta, P. 2000, “Aftermath of Banking Crises: Effects on Real and Monetary 
Variables”, IMF Working Paper 00/96.
Gupta, P., D. Mishra, and R. Sahay. 2001. “Output Response to Currency Crises”, 
IMF Working Papers 031229.
Hutchison, M. M. 2001. “A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Currency Crises and the 
Output Costs of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs”, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 8305.
Hutchison, M. and I. Neuberger. 2001, “Output Costs of Currency and Balance of 
Payments Crises in Emerging M arkets”, University o f California Santa Cruz 
Working Paper Series.
Hutchison, M. M,, and I. Noy. 2002. “Output Costs of Currency and Balance of 
Payments Crises in Emerging M arkets”, Comparative Economic Studies 44 
(2/3): 27-45.
Kaminsky, G. 1999. “Currency and Banking Crises: The Early Warnings of 
Distress”, IMF Working Paper 99/178.
Kaminsky, G,, S. Lizondo and C. Reinhart. 1998. ‘Eeading Indicators of Currency 
Crises”, IMF Staff Papers 5 (\), 1-48.
38
Kaminsky, G, and C.M. Reinhart. 1999. ‘T he Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking 
and Balance-of-Payments Problems”, The American Economic Review 89 (3), 
473-500.
Komulainen, T. and J. Lukkarila. 2003. “What Drives Financial Crises in Emerging 
Markets?”, BOFIT Discussion Papers (5).
Krugman. Paul. 1979. “ A Model of Balance o f Payments Crises”, Journal o f Money, 
Credit and Banking, 11,311-25.
Lane, Timothy and Steven Phillips. 1999. “ Macroeconomic Environment”, in Lane 
Timothy et eL (eds.), IMF-Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment, IMF Occasional Paper 178.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. and A. Razin. 1998. “ Sharp Reductions in Current Account 
Deficits: An Empirical Analysis”, European Economic Review 42, 897-908.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. and A. Razin. 1999. “ Current Account Reversals and Currency 
Crises: Empirical Regularities” Paper presented at NBER Conference on 
Currency Crises, Cambridge, Mass. 2/6/98.
Mishkin, Frederic S., 1999, “Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events,
Issues,”
Journal o f Economic Perspective, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 3-20.
M ontiel P., and C.M. Reinhart, “The Dynamics of Capital Movements to Emerging 
Economies During the 1990s,” forthcoming in Short-term Capital Movements 
and Balance o f Payments Crises, Griffith-Jones, Montes (eds.), (Helsinki: 
UNU/WIDER, 1997).
Moreno, R. 1999. “ Depreciation and Recessions in East Asia”, Federal Reserve 
Bank o f San Francisco Economic Review, 3, 27-40.
Mulder, Christian; Peirelli, Roberto; Rocha, Manuel, March 2002. ‘The Role of 
Corporate, Legal and Macroeconomic Balance Sheet Indicators in Crisis 
Detection and Prevention”, International Monetary Fund Policy Working 
Paper. WP/02/59, pp. 26.
Park, Y.C. and J.W. Lee 2002. "Recovery and Sustainability in East Asia,” in M.
Dooley and J. Frankel, Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, The 
University of Chicago Press.
Ranciere, R., A. Tomell, and F. Westermann. 2003. “Crises and Growth: A Re- 
evaluation”, NBER Working Paper, No. 10073.
Rodrik, Dani and Andres Velasco, 1999, “Short-Term Capital Flows,” NBER 
Working
Paper, W1364 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research).
39
Römer, Christiana, 1996, “Inflation and the Growth Rate of Output”, NBER Working 
Paper, W5575.
Sachs, J., A. Tomell, and A. Velasco. 1996. “Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: 
The Lessons from 1995”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1).
Salant S., D. Henderson. 1978. Market anticipation of government policy an the 
price of gold. Journal o f Political Economy 86, s. 627-648.
Stone, M. R. and M. Weeks. 2001. “Balance Sheets, Model Uncertainty, and 
Systemic Financial Crises”, IMF Working Paper.
The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects (1997/98)
Tomell, A. (April 1998). “ Reform from Within. ” NBER Working Paper, No. 6497.
40
APPENDIX
41
Table 2.1 Chronology of Crises
Country Currency Crisis Country Currency Crisis Country Currency Crisis
Argentina Feb-81
Jul-82
Colombia Mar-83
Feb-85
Philippines Oct-83
Jun-84
Sep-86 Sep-97 Feb-86
Apr-89 Sep-98 Jul-97
Feb-90 Aug-99 Thailand Jul-81
BoUvia Nov-82 Indonesia Apr-83 Nov-84
Nov-83 Sep-86 Jul-97
Sep-85 Dec-97 Jan-98
Brazil Feb-83 Jan-98 Sep-99
Nov-86 Israel Oct-83 Jul-00
Jul-89 Jul-84 Turkey Jan-80
Nov-90 Malaysia Aug-97 Mar-94
Oct-91 Jan-98 Uruguay Oct-82
Jan-99 Mexico Feb-82 Venezuela Feb-84
Chile Aug-82 Dec-82 Dec-86
Sep-84 Dec-94 Mar-89
Peru Oct-87 May-94
Dec-95
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Table 2.2 Specification of Selected Early Warning Models
DCSD(Berg, KLR GS-Watch EMRI DB Alarm
Borensztein, (KamiiislQr, (Goldman (Credit Suisse Clock
Milesi- Lizando and Sachs) First Boston) (Deutsche
Ferretti, 
and Pattillo)
Reinhart) Bank)
Crisis Weighted Same as DCSD Weighted Depreciation > 5% Various “trigger
Definition average of one- average of three- and at least points”
month Month changes Double of Depreciation >
changes in in exchange rate preceding month’s 10% and
exchange rate and Interest
and Reserves above rate increase >
reserves more country-specific 25% typical
than 3 (country- 
specific) 
standard 
deviations
threshold
above country 
average
Horizon 2 years 2 years 3 months 1 month 1 month
Method Probit Weighted (by Logit regression Logit regression Logit two-
regression with frequency of with (most) rhs with rhs equation
rhs correct variables Variables measured simultaneous
Variables predictions) measured as 0/1 in logs, then systems on
measured in average of hidicators based deviation from exchange rate
(country- indicators. on thresholds mean and and interest rate
specific) Variables Found in standardized “events” of
percentile terms measured as autoregression different
0/1 indicators with magnitude
according to Dummy
threshold chosen 
to minimize 
noise/signal ratio.
(SETAR)
Variables
Overvaluation Overvaluation Overvaluation Overvaluation Overvaluation
Current account 
Reserve losses Reserve losses
Export growth 
ST
Export growth Export growth Debt/Exports
Debt/Reserves
Reserves/M2 Reserves/M2
(level)
Reserves/M2 
(growth) 
Domestic credit
(level)
Growth of credit to
growth
Financing
requirement
private sector
Money multiplier Reserves/Imports Industrial
change (level) production
Real interest rate Oil prices Domestic credit 
growth
Excess M l 
balances
Stock market Stock price growth 
GDP growth
Stock market
Political event
Global liquidity 
Conta^on Regional conta^on Devaluation
43
contagion
Market pressure
contagion
Regional
dummies
Interest rate
“event”
Table 3.1 Table of Indicators
Expected
Indicators sign Explanation
Fiscal Sector Budget Balance /  GDP Insolvency expectations /  credit creation
External Sec.
capital acc. International reserves - Decreasing reserves signal market pressure
Interest rate differential + Signals devaluation expectation
- Attracts capital inflows
current acc. Current account /  GDP - Surplus creates demand for domestic currency
Exports Exports create demand for domestic currency
Imports + Imports decrease demand for domestic cunency
Overvaluation of RER - Harms competitiveness
Terms of Trade + Expensive exports
- Expensive imports
US interest rate + High rates induce capital outflows
Financial Sec. Excess real M l balances + Loose monetary policy may fuel crisis
M2 multiplier + Rapid credit growth fueled by liberalization induces risk
Domestic credit expansion + Lowers demand for domestic currency
Bank deposits - A bank run induces capital outflows
Lending rate /  Deposit rate - Low ratio signals unprofitable banks
+ Banks increase lending rates in crisis; poor loan quality
M2 /  Reserves + High ratio creates vulnerability
Domestic real interest rate + High rates cause liquidity crunch, non-performing loans
Banking crisis dummy + Induces capital outflows
M 2 / M l + Rapid credit growth fueled by liberalization induces risk
Real Sec. Industrial production - Recessions often accompany crisis
Stock prices Burst of asset bubbles precede financial crisis
Unemployment + Creates incentives to devalue
Inflation + Lowers demand for domestic currency
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Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities 
a.
b.
c.
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Figure 2 Impulse Response of Growth Rate of GDP to a Shock of Probability o f 
Crisis
a)
Argentina 
Lag length: 3
R e s p o n s e  o f G  G DP to C h o l e s k y  
O n e S . D . P R O B  I n n o v a tion
b)
Bolivia
Lag length: 17
Re s p o n s e  o f G G D P  to Cho l esky  
O n e S . D . P R O B  Innovat ion
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c)
Brazil
Lag length: 2
R e s p o n s e  o f G G  DP to C h o l e s k y
O n e  S . D .  P R O B  I nnovat i on
d)
Chile
Lag length: 4
Re s p o n s e  o f G G D P  to Chol esky  
O n e  S . D .  P R O B  Innovat ion
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e)
Colombia 
Lag length: 2
R e s p o n s e  o f G  G D P  to C h o l e s k y
O n e  S . D .  P R O S  I nnovat i on
f)
Mexico 
Lag length: 2
R e s p o n s e  o f G  G D P  to C h o l e s k y  
O n e  S . D .  P R O B  I n n o v a t i o n
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g)
Peru
Lag length: 2
R e s p o n s e  o f G G  DP to C h o l e s k y
O n e  S . D .  P R O B  I n n o v a t i o n
g)
Venezuela 
Lag length: 2
R e s p o n s e  o f G  G D P  to C h o l e s k y  
O n e  S . D .  P R O B  I n n o v a t i o n
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